This study provides circumstantial evidence for the impact of permits for employment in Israel on the Palestinian labor force in the West Bank during the late Intifada period and its aftermath (2005)(2006)(2007)(2008). The study utilizes a unique dataset that merges 
Bank to employment in Israel. 1 The increase in the number of permits is also correlated with a limited increase in the employment of unqualified Palestinians in the Israeli economy possibly because of a networking effect. Finally, we found evidence that the increase in employment permits contributed to the erosion of the return to schooling and raised the wages of unskilled workers, even in the internal West Bank market. A quantification of the results appears in the concluding section.
The analysis of Israeli permit policy takes into account the Israeli institutional and geographical set-up by distinguishing between permits for working in Israel This paper follows the empirical literature on the interaction between the Palestinian and Israeli labor markets, which starts with Angrist (1995 and 1996) 's analysis of the decline in the return to schooling during the 1980s when the supply of educated Palestinians increased, and the Israeli demand for Palestinian labor during the first intifada. A number of studies that followed Angrist examined the impact of the second intifada on Palestinian unemployment, employment and wages. Miaari and Sauer (2006) found that closure of the West Bank had a significant adverse impact on Palestinian employment even when account was taken of the effect of foreign workers in Israel.
2 Mansour (2010) interpreted changes in Palestinian employment in Israel as labor supply shocks and found that the increase in the supply of both skilled (more than 12 years of schooling) and unskilled workers in the territories primarily affected mainly the wages of unskilled workers, and had a little impact on wages of skilled.
1 It may be that people who previously had permits or think they will get permits are unwilling to take lower paying jobs. Thus they wait to get new permits and then go from being unemployed to employed in Israel.
2 Aranki (2004) presented similar findings but did not take into account foreign workers.
This paper also adopts Mansour's approach by differentiating between skilled and unskilled workers.
The relationship between terror attacks in Israel and the Palestinian labor market (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) was explored by Benmelech et al. (2009) . They found that an attempted suicide bombing was on average followed by an increase of 5.3 percentage points in unemployment, a reduction in wages by more than 20 percent and a reduction in employment in Israel by 6.7 percentage points among the residents of the suicide bomber's governorate. Presumably, these labor market outcomes were the result of Israeli anti-terror measures. On the other hand, a forthcoming study of the World Bank "finds little evidence that variations in closure intensity are correlated with variations in labor market indicators such as underemployment." 3 This paper looks into the impact of the Israeli permit policy, which was shaped mainly by the attempts to prevent terrorist attacks on Israeli civilians and by politicaldiplomatic concerns. Hence, it is directly related to the abovementioned studies of the Palestinian labor market during the second intifada. It differs from those studies in that it directly measures the impact of Israeli (permit) policy on the Palestinian labor force, rather than using data on closures collected by the UN or data on suicide bombings. This study also takes into account the Israeli institutional set-up by excluding Jerusalem and using the qualifications for getting a permit. Finally, unlike the above studies that focus on the most turbulent period of the second intifada (i.e.
2000-05)
, we examine the post intifada period when the level of violence had already declined.
The paper is structured as follows: Section II describes the main features of the Palestinian labor force in the West Bank and its development during the period 1999-2008. Section III briefly reviews permit policy. Section IV describes the LFS data used in the study and Section V presents the main empirical strategy. Section VII and Section VIII analyze the impact of permit policy on employment and on the return to schooling, respectively. Section IX concludes and discusses policy implications. Appendix A describes the permits for employment in the settlements, and Appendix B presents the main empirical results stratified for unskilled and skilled males.
II. The Palestinian Labor Force in the West Bank (1999-2008)
In 2008 I  II  III  IV  I  II  III  IV  I  II  III  IV  I  II  III  IV  I  II  III  IV  I  II  III  IV  I  II  III  IV  I  II  III  IV  I  II  III  IV  I  II  III  IV  I  II  III  IV   1999 The majority of the Palestinian labor force is employed in the internal West Bank market, which is characterized by diversity in types of jobs, both in the private and public sectors. On the other hand, Palestinians in the Israeli economy are typically employed in manual labor jobs in construction, agriculture and other industries. I  II  III  IV  I  II  III  IV  I  II  III  IV  I  II  III  IV  I  II  III  IV  I  II  III  IV  I  II  III  IV  I  II  III  IV  I  II  III  IV  I  II  III  IV  I  II  III  IV   1999 2) The unemployment rate calculated for all 21-45 year-old males, rather than just those participating in the labor force, as is the case in the conventional calculation.
3) Skilled workers have more than 12 years of schooling, and unskilled workers have less than 13 years of schooling.
Wages also differ between skilled and unskilled male workers and the difference is influenced by the employment in Israel. In the West Bank, the wages of skilled Palestinians were higher than those of unskilled Palestinians throughout the period. Indeed, the wage gap between skilled and unskilled workers was modest in In contrast, the wages of Palestinian workers in the Israeli economy were similar or even higher than those of skilled Palestinians employed in the West Bank.
Therefore, an increase in the share of workers in the Israeli economy allows more unskilled Palestinians to earn high wages and a high level of employment in the Israeli economy eroded the skill premium in the West Bank. I  II  III  IV  I  II  III  IV  I  II  III  IV  I  II  III  IV  I  II  III  IV  I  II  III  IV  I  II  III  IV  I  II  III  IV  I  II  III  IV  I  II  III  IV  I  II  III  IV   1999 percentage points in the wage ratio of skilled to unskilled workers in that governorate.
The skill premium is almost completely eroded, i. 3) The red line designates parity between wages of skilled and unskilled employees.
To certain extent the result presented in Figure VI -A is technical for much of the erosion in the wage premium is caused by those employed in the Israeli economy.
The data presented in Figure VI Figures VI and VII also depict the regional variation in permits to work in Israel: some governorates, such as Jericho, Jenin, and Nablus had a low ratio of permits to qualified males, while western and southern governorates (Tul Karm, Qalqilia, Salfit Hebron, and Bethlehem) had relatively high ratios. As a result, the large fluctuations in the number of permits in 2005-06 had a potentially larger impact on the regional labor force in western and southern governorates with high permit ratios as compared to those with low ratios. Indeed, much of the variation in permits utilized in the statistical estimations herein is in the early period in the western and southern governorates. We restricted the sample to 20-45 year-old Palestinian males since they comprise the majority of the West Bank labor force. Furthermore, older workers are less likely to be employed in the manual labor jobs that typically characterize Palestinian employment in the Israeli economy. We also excluded the governorate of Jerusalem from the sample since the majority of its residents hold Israeli identity cards and do not need a permit to work in Israel.
V. Empirical Methods
The empirical analysis of the impact of permits for working in Israel on the Palestinian labor force is based on the individual-level LFS data, which is matched with governorate-level Israeli administrative data. The individuals' labor market outcomes are typically represented by dummy variables that reflect employment status (unemployed, employed, etc.) or transitions into the employment status. The main explanatory variables are as follows:
• permits g,t : the ratio of permit holders in governorate g at time t to the number of 30-45 year-old males residing in the governorate. This statistic reflects the proportion of permit holders in the local Palestinian population who meet the age criterion for receiving a permit.
• qualify i,t and unqualified i,t : dummy variables that designate whether or not an individual i was met the personal criteria at time t to receive a permit for employment in Israel. These variables are complementary.
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The explanatory variables make it possible to estimate the change of the probability of a certain outcome for qualified (30-45 year-old and married) males and unqualified (other) males, which coincided with an increase in the number of employment permits. The estimations include both repeated cross-section estimations and panel estimations that track individuals over time. Formally, the cross section estimations are based on the following specification: Palestinians who worked in Israel for two weeks per month during a given quarter, are recorded as two utilized permits but are captured like one worker who worked full 11 It does not, however, avoid the bi-annual seasonality of the olive industry, which plays an important role in local rural production. 12 The inclusion of a variable "becoming qualified", that is switching from unqualified to qualified, did not yield meaningful results. 13 The attrition rate of individuals who were surveyed in a the first year and did not appear in the data in the nest year during the years 2005-08 is about 9 percent. month in the LFS. Therefore, the coefficient of the permits variable in the above regressions, when they are regressed on Palestinian permitted employment in Israel, is likely to be lower than unity even in an optimal estimation. I  II  III  IV  I  II  III  IV  I  II  III  IV  I  II  III  IV  I  II  III  IV  I  II  III  IV  I  II  III  IV  I  II  III  IV  I  II  III  IV  I  II  III We also use the regression analysis to establish that employment in the Israeli economy, as measured by the Labor Force Survey, actually reflects the employment permits granted by Israel at the governorate level, the basic unit of analysis in this study (Table I , Columns i-iv). The estimation of the base specifications with and without FE demonstrates that employment of qualified males in Israeli economy is indeed positively correlated with the number of permits issued, though not for unqualified males. The statistical significance of the FE estimation is somewhat higher than the OLS estimates, although the statistical fit is low in both cases.
Additional discrepancies between the
Columns iii and iv demonstrate that, as expected, the permits variable is strongly correlated with employment of unskilled workers, while the correlations with employment of skilled workers is limited and statistically insignificant. Columns v and vi show that controlling for whether the permits are for employment in the settlements or employment in Israel neither changes the estimates of the base specification, nor does it improve overall explanatory power. Therefore, we do not control for permits for employment in the settlements, when we explore the impact of the employment in Israel on the labor force characteristics herein.
14 The low magnitude of the coefficient in the various specifications, which varies around 0.5 and significantly lower than unity, is attributed to the discrepancies 14 Inclusion of these controls did not significantly alter the estimates in the other regressions.
mentioned above and primarily to the fact that the labor market outcome data (working in Israel or the settlements according to the LFS) refers to a given week while the explanatory variable (i.e. number of permits) refers to a given month and the fact that the number of employment permits reflects employment only in Israel and the LFS data also includes the settlements. • Permits g,t is the ratio of Palestinian holders of permit for employment in Israel in governorate g at time t over the number of males aged 30-44 in the governorate.
• Settlements-Permits g,t is the ratio of Palestinian holders of permit for employment in
Israeli settlements in governorate g at time t over the number of males aged 20-45 in the governorate.
• Qualify (and Unqualified) are dummy variables for individuals who (do not) satisfy the personal criteria for getting a permit (married and older than 30 years).
• Skilled (Unskilled) are males with more than 12 (less than 13) years of schooling.
The panel analysis (Table III line (Table I) . 15 The assertion that Israel's permit policy is reflected in the Palestinian LFS is further supported by the analysis of the probability of starting working in the Israeli economy with a permit even though due to data limitations these estimations refer to a shorter period (Table III line 8) .
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To conclude, Figure Table B-III) . 16 The correlation in cross-section analysis between the permits and employment in Israel with permit is positive, yet statistically insignificant. The greater share of Palestinians who switched from unemployment to employment in Israel is also reflected in the regression analysis. Table III ( panel estimation (Table III line (Table III lines 1 and 5, respectively). The correlation is relatively high and significant only for qualified males and barely significant for unqualified males in the cross-section estimations. Notably, the coefficients are larger than those estimated for the probability of working in Israel and the settlements (Table III lines (Table III 
VIII. The Impact of Employment Permits on Return to Schooling
Another feature of the Palestinian labor market is the relatively low economic return to schooling (estimated herein to 4.2 percent) in comparison to the return other economies (Flabbi et al., 2008; Trostel et al. 2002) . Research has shown that the return to schooling plays an important role in economic development. Rosenzweig (2010) surveyed the literature on the role of schooling in economic development, including the evidence that schooling enhances productivity and that schooling increases when the return to schooling rises. Cohen and Soto (2007) , as well as Ciccone and Papaioannou (2009), provide empirical evidence for the positive impact of schooling on economic growth from an international perspective. Furthermore, growth theory links an increase in the return to schooling to the demographic transition that typically heralds the switch to a modern growth regime (Becker, Glaeser and Murphy, 2009; Galor and Weil, 2000) .
There are a few plausible reasons for the low return to schooling in the West Bank. For instance, cheap schooling, such as that subsidized by UNRAW for refugees, may increase the demand for schooling. An alternative explanation is that barriers to economic development limit the demand for skilled workers out side the We estimate the relations between employment-permits and return to schooling using a Mincer equation augmented by a variable for the number of permits issued to residents in the worker's governorate normalized by the number of adult males and an interaction variable between the normalized number of employment permits and schooling. Formally, we estimate the following regression:
wage i,g,t = β 1 · schooling i,t + β 2 · permits g,t + β 3 · schooling i,t · permits g,t + γ ·X i,t
where wage i,g,t is the log of the monthly wage, schooling i,t is the years of schooling of individual i at time t, and permits g,t is the number of permit holders in governorate g at time t normalized by the number of 20-45 year-old males in the governorate. In addition, we include a vector of personal characteristics X i,t (age, dummies for residence in a rural area or refugee camp, etc.), as well as time dummies d t . The base specification, which does not include number of permits and the interaction term, is similar to the Mincer equation. Two other specifications, which include the number of permits and the interaction term between permits and schooling with and without governorate fixed effects, allow us to evaluate the effect of changes in the number of employment permits on return to schooling.
We also estimate panel specifications using the one-year differences in wages, the one-year difference in the number of permits and the interaction between schooling and the one-year difference in the number of permits. The panel specifications allow us to determine whether the wage schedules of individuals were affected by the change in the number of permits or by changes in the composition of workers, which could drive the results in the repeated cross-section analysis. is not merely a result of the composition of employees. 19 The estimations suggest that increase in the number of permits had practically zero effect on wages for those with 11 years of schooling (11.4~| β 2 / β 3 | in column iii). Notes: * 10%, **5%, *** 1% significance
• s.e. are clustered by governorate in parentheses.
• Schooling i,t is the years of schooling of individual i in period t; Permits g,t is the ratio of permits to number of 20-45 y.o. males in governorate g in period t.
• Coefficients for dummies for type of locality (rural, refugee camp), years age quarters, and governorates are not reported.
The estimated return to schooling in the internal West Bank labor market (Table V) is about 5.6 percent and is significantly higher than in the above estimation using the full sample (4.6 percent) for it includes the better-paid unskilled workers employed in Israel. The estimation results provide an indication of the indirect impact of the increase in the number of permits, which reduces the labor supply in the West Bank, on the return to schooling in the Palestinian economy. Thus, although adding the permits variable and the interaction between permits and schooling raises the base return to schooling to about 6.6 percent yet an increase in the number of employment permits reduces the overall return to education. Notably, the estimated effect of an increase in employment permits on the return to schooling in the West Bank labor market is lower than for the full sample. This is consistent with the interpretation that the sub-sample estimation reflects only the indirect impact of permits on the wages of unskilled workers via a reduction in the supply of unskilled labor in the Palestinian economy. Notes: * 10%, **5%, *** 1% significance
It should be mentioned that the results of the estimations of the impact of the permits on the return to schooling in hourly wage were very similar in the OLS and 
IX. Conclusions and Implications
The study The reasons for the increase of merely 50 qualified males employed in the Israeli economy (including the settlements) when the number of permits in Israel (only) include different geographical and period definitions and plausible misreporting either in the statistical or in the administrative data. Section V provides further details. seems to negate the common working-assumption that permitted workers replace non-permitted workers. The return to a year of schooling drops from 5.8 percent when no permits are available to 5 percent when 100 permits are granted to males in the illustrative governorate. 22 In addition, a reduction in the return to schooling is likely to enhance population growth at the expense of schooling to the extent that Palestinian fertility follows the standard Beckerian quantityquality pattern, i.e. a low return to schooling induces parents to prefer more but less-educated offspring over fewer but better-educated ones. This argument is modeled by Azarnert (2011). certain amount of market power in the Israeli labor market, the fee could also increase total Palestinian revenue from employment in Israel.
In contrast to Schiff's recommendation, Palestinian workers in Israel rarely pay income tax for their reported income is typically below the taxable income threshold in Israel (about NIS 4,700 as to 2011). Apparently, such income, which is significantly higher than the average monthly wage in the Palestinian economy, would be taxed in the Palestinian economy. This discrepancy is evident in the Palestinian income tax data: in 2010 about USD 140 Million were levied from workers in the West Bank while merely USD 0.5 Million were collected from workers in Israel. We believe that the wise management of Palestinian employment in Israel using tools beyond the number of permits -such as fees, age restrictions, managed geographic distribution -could stimulate the Palestinian economy while reducing the risks to its long-term development.
In addition, and the age profile of holders of the settlements-permit mirrors the ageprofile of the holders of the Israel-permits: the share of young settlementsemployment-permits holders is large, and it declines with age among Palestinians older than 30 years, the effective minimum age for getting a work permit in Israel (compare Figures V and A-I ). These features suggest that the two types of permits are substitutes and that some permitted workers in the settlements switched to employment in Israel, when it was possible, probably because of the higher wages paid in Israel. It is important to note the low inter-temporal volatility in the number of valid settlement permits during 2005-06, which is in contrast to the volatility of employment in Israel ( Figure VI ). This constitutes a major obstacle in estimating the impact of employment in the settlements on the Palestinian labor force. Specifically, the measure is highly correlated with the governorates' fixed effects and was dropped from the FE estimations (Table III) due to multi-collinearity. 
